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This thesis aims to investigate to which extent EU: s decoupled direct pay-
ments to farmers capitalise in higher prices of agricultural land during 2003-
2016 and how the capitalisation degree changes at the same time. To do so, 
it combines the traditional net present method with a hedonic pricing model, 
in order to evaluate the capitalising degree of different agricultural support 
forms. Quantile, OLS and panel data regressions are used to determine the 
correlation between the explanatory variables and the dependent variable (the 
price of agricultural land). The used explanatory variables are supposed to 
capture how the structure and profitability of the agricultural sector, locali-
sation of the agricultural land, agricultural support and demand of agricul-
tural land for other usage than agriculture influence the price of agricultural 
land. 
The study finds that if the decoupled direct payments increase by one % 
in a median municipality that is correlated with a price of agricultural land 
that is 0.54-0.77 % higher, ceteris paribus. The result is in line with previous 
research in the field, especially with Johansson & Nilsson (2012) and Kilian 
et al., (2012). The regressions on the higher and lower percentiles may indi-
cate that the capitalising degree is higher in municipalities with higher prices 
on agricultural land. 
The common agricultural policy, CAP, EU: s agricultural policy, deter-
mine regulations and the rules for agricultural support. In 2013, the CAP was 
reformed, and several policies was changed, but how the combination of 
these policy changes affect the capitalising degree was not known at that 
time. This study finds out that the 2013 CAP reform may have led to a de-
crease in the capitalising degree, from an estimated effect on 0.5 % to around 
0.2 %. However, the reform was not fully implemented until 2016, and there-
fore should the results be carefully handled. 
 
Keywords: Common Agricultural Policy, the price of agricultural land, 
capitalising of agricultural support, Quantile regression, Panel data regres-
sion 
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The background for the thesis, the problem description and the research 
questions are laid out in this chapter. In addition to that, delimitations and 
the aim for the thesis are described. 
1.1 Problem background 
Since Sweden joined the European Union (EU) in 1995, the price of agri-
cultural land has increased by a factor of more than 6. The average price per 
hectare of arable land in 2016 was 75 000 SEK and 28 000 SEK for pasture, 
which over ten years gives an increase in nominal terms on 91 % and 56 %, 
respectively (Statens Jordbruksverk, 2017). 
The average price of agricultural land differs widely in Sweden. The most 
fertile land in the southern parts of Sweden had a price of 180 000 SEK/ha 
in 2015, 80 000 SEK/ha more than in the second most expensive region. The 
average price of agricultural land in the northern parts of Sweden was at the 
same time 15 000 SEK (Statens Jordbruksverk, 2017). 
 The average price per hectare is, however, probably higher than what the 
official statistic says. The Swedish Board of Agricultural (SBA) underesti-
mate the price on arable land by 6-25 % and by 1-15 % for pasture. These 
underestimations occur since the statistic only include property transfers and 
1 Introduction 
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Figure 1. The average price of agricultural land. Source: SBA, own processing. 
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not property regulations. Due to favourable tax regulations, property regula-
tions often have a higher price per hectare and concern larger purchases 
(Statens Jordbruksverk, 2017). According to LRF Konsult, the average price 
for arable land was 125 000 SEK per hectare in 2016 (LRF Konsult, 2018), 
while the official statistic states 75 000 SEK per hectare. 
Figure 2 is an index over the average price of agricultural land, income 
from agricultural activity and tenancy prices in Sweden. As can be seen, these 
three variables had the same development until 2004, when the price of ag-
ricultural land started to increase in a much higher pace. Since farmers pay 
the land rent with income from agriculture, the income from agricultural is 
closely connected with the tenancy price. The price of agricultural land can 
on the other hand depend on more factors than just the profitability since it 
can be viewed as an asset (Swinnen et al., 2013). 
Increased prices on agricultural land are beneficial for farmers that own 
the land they cultivate, but harmful for tenants (Johansson & Nilsson, 2012; 
Kilian et al., 2012). It is also negative for young farmers that want to buy 
land and start their career (Swinnen et al., 2008). Furthermore, high price on 
agricultural land decrease the speed of the structure rationalisation and de-
crease the growth in the sector since it increases the cost for farms to expand. 
On the other hand, high price on land force farmers to be more effective, 
regarding cost-efficiency and yield levels (Jordbruksverket, 2007; Johansson 
& Nilsson, 2012; Kilian et al., 2012). 
EU: s agricultural policy, Common Agricultural Policy, CAP, provide 
substantial support to farmers within the union. The main support comes in 
forms of decoupled direct payments, a support system where farmers receive 
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Figure 2. Price index over land price, income and tenancy price. Source: SBA, own processing. 
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support in relation to the hectare size they cultivate. In the 2013 CAP reform, 
the model for how to calculate the decoupled direct payments was modified, 
from a historical/hybrid model to a regional model. Previously, support level 
could be based on both the number of hectares cultivated and historical num-
bers over the production and profitability, resulting in different payments per 
hectare among farmers. Between 2015 – 2020, Sweden will harmonise the 
support levels, with the result that the direct payments per hectare are equal 
for all farmers 2020 (Larsson, 2014). 
Swedish governments have always, regardless of its political orientation, 
advocated for a reformed CAP. The goal has been a smaller budget, less 
trade-distorting policies and a more market based agricultural sector. A major 
criticism towards CAP from the Swedish government has been against the 
direct payments. Sweden argues that the direct payments increase the price 
of land, since the payments are capitalised in higher land value, which coun-
teracts with the aim of a more market-orientated CAP (Elgström & Rosén 
Sundström, 2016). 
The subject if, and how, agricultural support capitalise in higher land 
prices and land value has been widely discussed in the literature, e.g. Rosen, 
(1974); Pope et al., (1979); Burt, (1986); Palmquist, (1989); Weersink et al., 
(1999); Goodwin et al., (2003); Swinnen et al., (2008); Johansson & Nilsson, 
(2012); Swinnen et al., (2013) and Ciaian et al., (2014). A Swedish study by 
Johansson & Nilsson (2012) concludes that the price of agriculture land is on 
average 0.6 % higher in municipalities with 1 % higher direct payments. No 
study has however investigated how the direct payments affect the capitalis-
ing degree in Europe over several years or over a policy shift. 
The modified model, introduced in the 2013 CAP reform, on how to cal-
culate the level of the decoupled direct payments will, according to Kilian et 
al., (2012) and Swinnen et al., (2013), increase the amount of agricultural 
support that is capitalised in land values. The harmonisation of the support 
level will increase the demand for land on the margin, and since land prices 
and land rents are decided on the margin, capitalising will increase. 
Other policy changes in the 2013 CAP reform, on the other hand, have a 
negative effect on the capitalising degree and will, therefore, be able to 
counterbalance the effect of the harmonisation (Ciaian et al, 2014). These 
policy changes are: 
- A new greening support that introduces more climate and 
environmentally beneficial practices, such as crop diversification, 
maintenance of permanent grassland and ecological focus areas. Due 
to a more extensive regulatory framework may the greening support 
lead to a reduction in land productivity and profitability, and hence in 
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lower bids on farmland. If the greening support rules are violated, a 
farmer can lose up to 30 % of the decoupled direct payments. 
- A  differentiation of support between farmers (extra payments to 
young farmers, for example), which will increase the variance in 
support level, leading to a decrease in demand for land on the margin. 
1.2 Problem 
 
It is, given the above considerations, i.e the increased landprices, the 2013 
CAP-reform and the argument from the Swedish government, that 
agricultural support, mainly the decoupled direct payments, increase the 
price on agricultural land, interesting to investigate how the capitalising 
degree have changed over time. The research questions for this thesis are, 
therefore: 
- To which extent is EU’ s agricultural support within the CAP, especially 
looking at the decoupled direct payments, capitalised in agricultural land 
prices in Sweden during 2003 – 2016 and how does the capitalising degree 
change over the same time, particularly after the 2013 CAP reform? 
The research questions are answered by a combination of the traditional 
capitalisation model and a hedonic pricing model. Conventional (mean) and 
quantile regressions will determine how the agricultural support affects the 
price of agricultural land. Also, a panel data regression for the years 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013 is performed to investigate the overall effect that 
agricultural support has on the price of agricultural land. 
1.3 Aim and delimitations 
This thesis aims to investigate how agricultural support capitalises in ag-
ricultural land prices in Sweden and how the degree of capitalisation changes 
over time. Swedish data on agricultural land prices for the years 2003, 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2016 and variables that affect the price of land 
will be used for answering the research questions. 
In the investigation, pasture and arable land will be treated as agricultural 
land. Combining these two types of land is not the best option since the two 
types of land have different prices, but it is necessary since the dataset used 
cannot isolate the capitalisation effect on one single type of land. 
Also, municipalities were agricultural land stands for less than two 
percent of the total area are excluded from the dataset. The exclusion of this 
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municipalities is made since data from these municipalities would be based 
on few market transactions. 
1.4 Disposition 
Chapter 1 provides necessary knowledge about the prices on agricultural 
land in Sweden, the CAP and introduces the problem and research questions. 
Chapter 2 builds the theoretical framework and provides a literature review 
of factors that influence the price of agricultural land and earlier research on 
capitalising of support. The empirical framework is presented in chapter 3, 
where the method is developed together with the theoretical ground for how 
to estimate the value of land. Also, the data and regressions coefficients are 
described. The result of the study is presented in chapter 4 and discussed and 
analysed in chapter 5. Chapter 6 includes conclusions and suggestions for 
further research. 
1.5 Contribution 
This thesis will contribute with new knowledge on how EU: s direct pay-
ments capitalise in land value in Sweden and how the degree of capitalisation 
change over time and over policy changes.  
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The theoretical framework focus on the development of EU: s agricultural 
support scheme while the literature review study factors affecting agricul-
tural land price and how agricultural support are capitalised in land value. 
2.1 The Common Agricultural Policy 
The MacSharry reform (1992) of EU: s Common Agricultural Policy in-
troduced a new form of support to the farmers in the union, namely the cou-
pled direct payments. Instead of a price support policy, where EU intervened 
and bought commodities every time the market price went under a threshold, 
farmers now began to receive support based on the number of animals the 
farmer had and the number of hectares the farmer cultivated. The coupled 
direct payments were less production-driving than the intervention policy, 
but trade and market decisions were still affected since the direct payments 
were coupled to production (O'Neill & Hanrahan; 2016, Kilian et al., 2012; 
Ciaian et al., 2014). 
In 2003 CAP was reformed once again, the so-called Fischler Reform, 
implemented in 2005. The coupled direct payments where replaced by the 
Single Farm payment (SFP), introducing the decoupled direct payments. To 
be able to receive support under the SFP-rules, a farmer must cultivate at 
least four hectares, keep the land in a cultivatable condition and follow cross-
compliance rules. The decoupled direct payments are based on the numbers 
of hectares a farmer cultivate, but farmers can receive different support levels 
per hectare, depending on the value of their entitlements. The number and 
value of each entitlement a farmer was given were based on a historical 
model, a regional model or a hybrid model (O'Neill & Hanrahan, 2016; 
Kilian et al., 2012; Ciaian et al., 2014). 
In the historical model1, the value of a farmer’s entitlements was calcu-
lated by dividing the farmer’s average direct payments between 2000 and 
2002 with the average number of hectares the farmer cultivated under the 
same period. The farmers received as many entitlements as hectares they on 
averaged had farmed. 
                                                 
1 Implemented by Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Wales and Scotland (Ciaian et al., 2014). 
2 Theoretical framework 
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In the regional model2, all entitlements in a region have the same value. 
The value was calculated by dividing the average sum of the region’s coupled 
direct payments between 2000 to 2002 with the number of hectares in the 
implementation year. Each farm received as many entitlements as hectares 
the farm cultivated in the implementation year. 
The hybrid model combines the historical and regional model, which 
gives a higher variance in entitlements value between farmers than in the 
regional model, but a lower variance compared to the historical model. 
Figure 3 shows the evolution of EU: s agriculture support. The amount of 
coupled direct payments has decreased since 2005, almost totally replaced 
by the SFP/decoupled direct payments (European Commission: DG 
Agriculture and Rural Development, 2017). 
CAP was reformed once again in 2013. It was then decided that member 
states (MS) should change implementation model, from the historical/hybrid 
model to the regional (Ciaian et al., 2014). Because of this, Sweden will un-
der 2015–2020 shift from the hybrid to the regional model. In 2020, all enti-
tlements in Sweden will have the same value, expected to be 193 EUR (Lars-
son, 2014). Other policy changes are differentiation of support between farm-
ers and the new greening support (Ciaian et al., 2014). 
 
                                                 
2 Used by Malta and Slovenia (Ciaian et al., 2014). 
Figure 3. The evolution of CAP. Source: European Commission, 2017. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
Johansson & Nilsson (2012) use a cross-sectional log-log quantile regres-
sion approach, using market data on property transfers in Sweden 2007-2008 
as dependent variable. Johansson & Nilssons results indicates that the price 
of agricultural land is 0.6 % higher in municipalities with 1 % higher decou-
pled direct payments, compared with the median municipality. The authors 
do also find that the capitalising degree of the decoupled direct payments is 
higher for the 75th quantile than for the median and lower for the 25th quantile 
than for the median, estimated to be 0.72 and 0.47 respectively, compared to 
the estimated median elasticity on 0.6. This implies that in municipalities 
with high prices on agricultural land is a larger amount of support capitalised 
in land prices. 
Environmental compensation has, on the other hand, a negative correla-
tion with the land value, indicating that municipalities that receive more en-
vironmental support than average are characterized by lower land prices. The 
negative connection between environmental supports and the price of land is 
probably linked to the fact that farmers who gets higher environmental com-
pensation cultivate poorer and more restricted land. This imply that farmers 
may be under-compensated for their environmental commitments. 
The authors stress however the importance of causality and correlation. 
The estimated positive effect of the decoupled direct payments and the neg-
ative connection between environmental support and the price of agricultural 
land indicates that it exists a correlation between support and the price, but it 
does not say anything about the causality. The direct payments per hectare 
are higher in municipalities with higher agricultural profitability and prices 
on land hectare due to the hybrid implementation model. It is therefore not 
sure that the decoupled direct payments drive up the price on agricultural 
land, only that it to a large extent capitalise into land value. 
Except for the direct payments and environmental compensations, the fol-
lowing variables have a significant effect on the price of land; fertility of the 
soil, average farm size in the municipality, if there are more horse farms in 
the municipality than average in Sweden and the level of urbanisation in the 
municipality. 
 
Kilian et al. (2012) discuss how policy changes in the 2003 CAP reform, 
the Fischler reform, affect the degree of capitalisation and land value and 
conducts a cross-sectional log-log regression analysis on the capitalising de-
gree of decoupled direct payments in land rental prices in Bavaria, Deutsch-
land. 
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The connection between agricultural support and land increase due to the 
Fischler reform, due to the decoupling of the direct payments. Decoupled 
direct payments have, compared with coupled direct payments and the for-
mer intervention price policy, a stronger connection to the area cultivated. 
The stronger connection occurs since the decoupled direct payments are 
based only on the number of hectares a farmer cultivates, which previous 
support has not been based on. From this follows that the amount of land a 
farmer cultivates is more important then before, when it comes to the level 
of the agricultural support. The effect of a stronger connection between land 
and support should therefore be an increase in land value, ceteris paribus, 
and that the degree of support that capitalise in land value increases, com-
pared with before the Fischler reform. 
Another finding is that the support level is expected to have a higher value 
at the margin in the regional entitlements model than in the historical model, 
implying a higher capitalising degree in the regional model. On the other 
hand, due to reduction in the support budget, the value of SFP will decrease 
over time and since cross-compliance regulations can impose higher costs 
for farmers, the marginal value may reduce. 
Included in the regression analysis are variables that capture the effect of 
natural conditions, market structure, agricultural support and other land mar-
ket demands. Following variables are found to be statistically significant: soil 
quality, plot size, share of rental area, share of utilised agricultural land 
(UAA) on total land area, direct regional payments, direct historical pay-
ments, support to less-favoured areas (LFA), agri-environmental payments 
and share of new rental contracts. 
The result indicates that direct payments have a highly significant positive 
influence on rental prices, and thereby on land prices. The estimated elastic-
ity is of 0.413 and 0.35 for cropland, and 0.777 and 0.28 for all agricultural 
land, respectively. Hence, one more euro in direct payments will increase the 
price of renting cropland/agricultural land with 28 – 78 cents. 
Agricultural environmental payments have a significant negative effect, 
with an associated estimated coefficient equal to -0.22 on cropland, but no 
significant effect on the price on all agricultural land. The negative effect on 
cropland is probably due to higher restrictions on land use, restrictions which 
on the other hand should be covered by the payments. The negative sign can 
indicate that more farmers with less productive land than what was thought 
are applying for environmental payments. Payments to less-favoured areas 
are positive, with an estimated elasticity of 0.292 for cropland, 0.191 for all 
utilised agricultural land. The positive effect of the LFA-support can be due 
to over-compensation. 
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Ciaian et al. (2014) investigate what effect the 
2013 CAP reform has on the capitalising degree 
of support in land rental prices and land value. 
The article highlights that the degree of 
capitalisation differs depending on several fac-
tors. These factors are, among others, the ratio 
between entitlements–and eligible arable land, 
the implementation model (regional, hybrid or 
historical), cross-compliance and land market 
regulations, tradability of entitlements, imper-
fections on the capital market and length of 
rental contracts. 
The article stresses the fact that the degree of 
capitalisation is higher for farms with low-value 
entitlements. Farms with low-value entitlements 
cannot pay as high rent as farms with high-value 
entitlements, with the result that a larger part of 
the low-value entitlements will be capitalised in 
land rental and land prices. From this follows 
that the capitalisation will be higher in MS that 
have implemented a regional or hybrid model, 
compared to the historical model, since the vari-
ance between the payments is lower, or equal to 
zero, as Figure 4 shows. According to this, the 
change from a historical to a regional model in 
the 2013 reform will increase the capitalisation degree. 
Also, since all farmers in the regional model receive the same payments 
per hectare, the asymmetric information on the market will decrease, result-
ing in a more transparent market and higher prices on agricultural land ac-
cording to Ciaian et al. On the other hand, the differentiation of support be-
tween farms and the greening can counterbalance these effects. The differen-
tiation of payments between farmers creates variance in the entitlements 
value while the greening reduces land productivity due to cultivation re-
striction, as explained in the introduction of this thesis. 
However, is it not possible to identify the net effect of the 2013 CAP re-
form, despite knowledge on how each policy change probably may affect the 
capitalisation degree, since MS can implement policies differently and all 
MS have unique agricultural sectors. 
 
Figure 4. Capitalization de-
gree in the historical and regional 
model. The red line is the capital-
ising degree in the two different 
models, indicating a larger capi-
talising in a regional model. Own 
processing. 
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Latruffe & Le Mouël (2009) has made a meta-study that provides an 
overview of the existing empirical and theoretical literature concerning 
capitalisation of agricultural support. A finding that Latruffe and Le Mouël 
does is that the evolution of agricultural support in industrialised countries, 
from price support instruments to different variants of direct support, often 
area-based, results in a higher degree of capitalisation, due to the stronger 
connection to the land. The overview shows that all studies that have found 
a relationship between agricultural support and price of land conclude that 
the elasticity of land price has an estimate between zero and one. This means 
that support raises the price of land, but the increase in price is never larger 
than the increase in support. An explanation for this inelasticity could be an 
uncertainty about the future, in the sense that farmers cannot be sure that they 
will receive support forever. 
 
Brady et al. (2017) investigate how the decoupling of direct payments and 
removal of the set-aside area in 2005 have affected the agricultural structure 
in the south of Sweden, with a focus on passive farming. Passive farming 
occurs when farmers found it more profitable to keep land in a cultivatable 
condition and receive direct payments for it, without cultivating the land, so-
called fallow. Passive farming slows down the rationalisation of the 
agricultural sector in theory since land that could be used by expanding farm-
ers is put in fallow. 
The study’s result is that passive farming mostly exists on low productive 
land, which prevents the marginal farmland from being abandoned. There-
fore, passive farming does not have any large negative effect on the economy 
or agricultural development since the land would not have been used for com-
modity production due to bad profitability. Contrary, if the profitability in 
the sector were to increase can fallow easily be converted to agricultural land, 
since it has been kept in good condition. 
 
Lundell & Östlund (2010) investigate what factors that affects the price 
of agricultural land around Mälardalen in Sweden. Three hedonic pricing 
models are used on a cross-sectional dataset, where the dependent variable is 
divided into three subgroups, depending on the reason for the purchase (ag-
ricultural production, interest group and accommodation group). 
Significant influencing factors for the production group are interest rate, 
average price on cereals, average yield in the area, average salary in the 
municipality, population density, hunting possibility and distance to the 
country road. The biggest effect on the price of land has the average price of 
cereals. It has been found in this study that if the price per kilogram of wheat 
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increases by 1 SEK, the per hectare price of agricultural land increase by 
13 660 SEK. 
For the people who buy a property for interest but not are full-time farmers 
are the significant variables time dimension, average yield in the area, pop-
ulation density, the number of sales in the area and travel time to Stockholm. 
The travel time to Stockholm influence the price much, one extra hour of 
travel reduces the price per hectare with 19 000 SEK. 
For the accommodation group, buyers that only buy the property for living 
reasons, the following variables are significant: interest rate, the time 
dimension, population density, if a real estate agency sells the property, 
travel time to closest city, hunting possibility, travel time to Stockholm and 
the possibility to rent out the agricultural land. 
 
Westman (2013), investigate what factors that influence the price of agri-
cultural land in Östergötland by a hedonic pricing model, using a cross-
section dataset. The explanatory variables are divided into four groups: i) 
production variables, ii) the structure of the agricultural sector, iii) location 
and iv) time. The fertility of the soil is highly significant and important for 
determining the value of land. If the average yield increase with 1 000 
kilograms more per hectare will the price per hectare increase of 33 000 SEK, 
ceteris paribus. Interestingly is none of the location-specific variables (dis-
tance to a city with more than 10 000 inhabitants, distance to country road 
and the number of sold vacation homes) statically significant, which can be 
compared to Lundell & Östlund (2014). However, an explanation for this can 
be that the dataset only includes agricultural land and not sales of land with 
buildings on it. 
 
 13 
 
Author(s) Country Year Studied year R2 Obs. Variable Effect Significane
Johansson & NilssonSweden 2012 2007-2008 52% 273 Fertility of soil 0,58 ***
Dependent variable: SEK/ha in municipality Share of pasture 0,19
Logarithmic form Average farm size 0,22 ***
Number of sales -0,07
Spec. Cattle & milk -15 *
Spec. pig/poultry 6,08
Spec. horse 16 **
DP per hectare 0,62 ***
Envi. Comp payments/ha -0,38 ***
Nr. of recreation house 0,07 *
Urbanization index 0,34 ***
Kilian, et. al. Germany 2012 2005 54% 1072 Soil quality 3,62 ***
Dependent variable: Rental price of cropland, EUR/ha. Average field size 51,9 ***
Logarithmic form Share of rental area -112 ***
Farms per 100 ha UAA 2,60
Installed biogas power (kW/ha) 0,63
The share of EAA of total land 55,1 ***
DP historical (EUR/ha) 0,41 ***
DP regional (EUR/ha) 0,35 ***
Payment to LFA (EUR/ha) 0,29 *
Envi. comp payments/ha -0,22 **
% with new rental contracts 0,20 **
Kilian, et. al. Germany 2012 2005 59% 1154 Soil quality 3,82 ***
Dependent variable: Rental price of UAA, EUR/ha. Average field size 39,0 ***
Logarithmic form Share of rental area -84,5 ***
Farms per 100 ha UAA 8,97 ***
Installed biogas power (kW/ha) 0,85 **
The share of EAA of total land 87,1 ***
DP historical (EUR/ha) 0,78 ***
DP regional (EUR/ha) 0,28 ***
Payment to LFA (EUR/ha) 0,19 *
Envi. comp payments/ha -0,06
% with new rental contracts 0,16 **
Lundell & ÖstlundSweden 2010 2005-2009 47% 54 Average yield 0,01 *
Dependent variable: SEK/ha Interest rate -4,03 *
Production group Average price cereals 0,01 *
Logarithmic form Average salary in municipality 0,37 *
Population density -0,10 *
Hunting possibility (d) -7,66 *
Distance to road 6,23 *
Lundell & ÖstlundSweden 2010 2005-2009 63% 35 Time dimension 6,23 *
Dependent variable: SEK/ha Average yield 0,01 *
Interest group Population density -0,13 *
Logarithmic form Number of sales -2,12 *
Distance to Stockholm -0,33 *
Lundell & ÖstlundSweden 2010 2005-2009 60% 27 Time dimension 5,34 *
Dependent variable: SEK/ha Interest rate 5,29 *
Accommodation group Population density 0,23 *
Logarithmic form Hunting possibility (d) 13,8 *
Distance to town 0,29 *
Sold by real estate agency (d) 31,7 *
Renting out arable land (d) 8,85 *
Westman Sweden 2013 2009-2012 87% 74 Average yield 0,71 ***
Dependent variable: SEK/ha Net wealth in municipality 0,56 ***
Logarithmic form Share of cropland in property 0,27 ***
Number of farmers > 200 ha 0,16 **
Sales in 5km? 0,09 ***
Sold in 2010? -0,08 ***
Arable area 0,07 **
Property <10 ha 0,06
Dist. to town > 10 000 inhabitant-0,07
Dist. country road 0,03
Property regulation? -0,03
10-50 ha 0,04
Sold in 2012? (d) -0,05
Share cropland in municipality -0,05
Cows/ha cropland in municipality-0,10
Num. of sold vacation homes -0,29
Region for direct payments 0,06
Sold in 2009? (d) -0,01
Sold in 2011? (d) 0,00
*** indicates statistical significance at 1 % significance level
** indicates statistical significance at 5 % significance level
* indicates statistical significance at 10 % significance level
Table 1. Summary of factors influencing the price of land from the literature review. 
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2.4 Summarised findings in the theoretical framework 
Factors that influence the price of agricultural land 
Economists have over a long period discussed which factors affect the 
price of agricultural land. Early on was the distance to market (Smith, A., 
1776) and fertility of the soil (Thünen, J.H., 1826) known as factors that in-
fluenced the price of land. But, as found in the literature review, there are 
other factors, such as urbanisation, the structure of the agricultural sector, 
government regulations and demand for agricultural land for usage as indus-
try or housing land, that influence and determine the price of agricultural 
land. 
In Table 1 are all regressors in the econometric studies gone through in 
the literature review presented. The table provides an overview of which fac-
tors that, according to these studies, influence the price of agricultural land. 
The variables found that affects the price of land can be divided into different 
subgroups; Agricultural economic variables, Location/urbanisation varia-
bles and Agricultural support variables. In chapter 3.3 Regression coeffi-
cients are the variables used in this thesis described and explained. 
 
Capitalising degree and policy changes 
It has been found that EU: s direct payments capitalise in agricultural land 
price value. The capitalising degree in Sweden was found to be 0.6 % in 
2007-2008 (Johansson & Nilsson, 2012) and between 0.28-0.77 % in Bavaria 
(Kilian et al., 2012). Environmental support has in both studies a negative 
correlation with the land price, while LFA-support is found to have a positive 
effect on the land price in Bavaria. 
The decoupling of direct payments stipulated in the 2003 CAP reform 
should increase the capitalisation degree according to the literature review. 
This since the decoupled payments only depend on the area cultivated, 
strengthen the connection between land and support. 
Furthermore, the capitalisation degree will also depend on which entitle-
ment model (regional, historical or hybrid) that was implemented by the MS. 
Those MS that implemented a regional or hybrid model will have a higher 
capitalising degree since the variance of entitlement value is lower on the 
marginal. Since the 2013 CAP reform states that MS should shift to the re-
gional entitlements model is it likely that the capitalising degree will in-
crease. With start in 2015, Sweden will shift towards a regional model, a shift 
that will be finished in 2020. 
Other changes in the 2013 reform that may affect the capitalising degree 
are the differentiation of support to farmers and the greening-support, where 
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farmers are obliged to follow new and stricter environmental rules. These 
policy changes have a negative effect on the capitalising degree since they 
increase the variance in payments and may reduce the productivity and profit 
in the sector due to harder restrictions. 
 
Gap in literature 
The literature review has provided knowledge on which factors that 
influence the price of agricultural land and how agricultural support 
capitalise in land value. However, the literature has not been able to provide 
any empirical studies on how the capitalising degree changes over time or on 
how the policy changes in the 2013 CAP reform affect the capitalising 
degree. This thesis will, therefore, be the first that empirically investigate the 
effect of the policy changes in CAP, implemented in 2014 on the capitalising 
degree, and how the capitalising degree changes over time. 
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In this chapter is the theory behind and the econometric methods for solv-
ing the research questions described and developed. Data for the dependent 
variable, the price of agricultural land in Sweden, is presented, together with 
the regressors that will be included in the regressions. 
3.1 Land value theory: Net present method 
Studies on land value have often been based on supply-demand models, 
even if economists early on noted that other factors than supply and demand 
affect land value, (Weersink et al., 1999). Furthermore, land cannot be 
viewed as a classic supply-demand market and not estimated as one, since 
land is a highly inelastic product (Burt, 1986). Also, supply-demand models 
developed in the 1960’s did not explain price developments and structural 
changes that agricultural land went through in the 1970’s (Pope et al., 1979). 
Due to this, most studies after the 1970’s exclude the supply side and focus 
solely on demand drivers (Weersink et al., 1999), using a traditional capital-
isation model (net-present value model) (Latruffe & Le Mouël, 2009). In a 
net present value model, the value of the land is thought to be the present 
value of all future earnings and cash flows discounted with the risk that each 
earning has (Goodwin et al., 2003): 
𝐿𝑡 = ∑
𝐸(𝑅𝑡+𝑖)
(1+𝑟𝑡+1)(1+ 𝑟𝑡+2)…(1+𝑟𝑡+𝑖)
∞
𝑖=0 .   [1] 
Lt is the price of land per hectare at the start of period t; Rt is the real return 
from each hectare land at the end of period t; rt is the real discount rate for 
period t; and E is the expectation on return conditional on information in 
period t (Weersink et al., 1999). Assuming that agents are risk neutral, that 
discount rate is constant and that it is the same tax rate on rental income and 
capital, the net-present model becomes: 
𝐿𝑡 = (1 + 𝑟)
−1 ∑
𝐸(𝑅𝑡+𝑖)
(1+𝑟)𝑖
∞
𝑖=0    [2] 
Equation [2] can be simplified to the traditional capitalisation formula if 
the residual return Rt is assumed to be constant in each period, R* (ibid.): 
𝐿𝑡 =
𝑅∗
𝑟
     [3] 
3 Empirically framework and data 
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Since farmers often have earnings from both markets transfers and gov-
ernment payments can the traditional capitalisation model be developed to 
account for several net returns’ components: 
𝐿𝑡 = ∑ (𝑏1
𝑖 𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+𝑖 + 𝑏2
𝑖 𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1)
∞
𝑖=1
   [4] 
P represents market returns and G government payments; bj is the dis-
count rate for the jth source of income. The model allows for using different 
discount rates for different sources of income, related to the uncertainty of 
that earning (ibid.). However, if all cash flow grows at the same pace and all 
cash flows from the same source have the same discount rate (𝑏𝑖
𝑗
 = bj for all 
i), then [4] simplifies to 
𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐸𝑡𝑃𝑡+1 +  𝛽2𝐸𝑡𝐺𝑡+1   [5] 
In equation [5] is all government farm payments lumped into one indicator 
(G). However, since it can exist several supports to farmers from the govern-
ment, new variables can be added (Goodwin et al., 2003). 
3.2 Land value theory: Hedonic pricing model 
The price of land is however made up of more variables than the amount of 
future earnings, as the literature review has shown. In 1776, Adam Smith 
suggested that the distance from the parcel to the market affected the price of 
agricultural land. Von Thünen looked at the localisation of land and distance 
from cities and markets, while Ricardo stressed the importance of the fertility 
of the soil (Smith, A. (1776); Von Thünen, J.H. (1826); Sraffa P. & M.H: 
Dobb (2005), see Johansson & Nilsson. (2012)). 
The net present method explains only the part of the price that is made up 
of future earnings. A hedonic pricing model can be used to grasp the effect 
of other variables. It investigates the inferences between the price and the 
land characteristics. To intuitively explain what hedonic pricing model is, 
think of two identical parcels, with the only difference that the soil quality of 
parcel 1 yields an average harvest of 5 tons of wheat per hectare while the 
soil quality of parcel 2 yields an average harvest of 6 tons wheat per hectare. 
Ceteris paribus, on a competitive land market, the difference in market price 
between parcel 1 and parcel 2 should only depend on the difference in soil 
quality and, thus reflect the value of the soil quality. Hence, the hedonic pric-
ing model is a way to set a marginal value of the characteristics of a good 
(Haab & McConnell, 2002). 
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In 1974, Rosen developed a model, based on the theory of hedonic pric-
ing, for valuing consumer products, taking the products different character-
istics into account. A product formed by n characteristics is described by 
(Rosen, 1974) as: 
𝑧 = (𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, … , 𝑧𝑛)    [6] 
Given [6] can the price of product z be derived, as a function of its char-
acteristics (ibid): 
𝑃(𝑧) = 𝑃(𝑧1, 𝑧2, 𝑧3, … , 𝑧𝑛)   [7] 
Rosen's model was further developed by Palmquist to a model of the de-
rived demand for a differentiated production factor, especially agricultural 
land (Palmquist, 1989). Palmquist shows, using Rosen’s hedonic pricing 
model [7], that both buyers and sellers are unable to influence the market 
equilibrium price P. A farmer’s willingness to pay for a parcel depends on 
its characteristics z, its output x and the farmer’s availability and capability 
to farm, α, which creates equation [8] (Palmquist, 1989): 
𝑔(𝑧, 𝑥, 𝛼) = 0    [8] 
Some recent studies combine the traditional capitalisation model and the 
hedonic pricing models, making it possible to see both how earnings from 
farming the land and possible alternative usage of the land affect the value  
(Johansson & Nilsson, 2012). 
To conclude, the traditional way of valuing land value by a capitalisation 
formula (equation [5]) captures the effect of agricultural related future pay-
ments. However, the literature review has shown that there are more factors 
than just future payments that influence the price of land. A model for inves-
tigating how non-agricultural factors and characteristics influence the price 
of land is the hedonic pricing approach (equation [7]). It is possible to com-
bine the two models (equation [8]) and by a regression analyse investigate 
the inferences between land characteristics and land prices. 
3.3 Regression techniques 
OLS regression 
The most common regression technique for running a multiple cross-sec-
tional regression is Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression. OLS estimates 
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the effect of the regressors on the mean value of the dependent variable 
(Stock & Watson, 2015). The basic OLS model looks like: 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  [9] 
The dependent variable Pi is the price per hectare of agricultural land in 
municipality i, β0 is the intercept and the parameters β1, 2, 3 are the different 
regression coefficients associated with the various explanatory variables. E 
is a vector with agricultural economic explanatory variables for each munic-
ipality i; S is a vector containing agricultural support explanatory variables 
for municipality i receive; and L is a vector with explanatory variables that 
relate to location-specific characteristics in municipality i. εi is the stochastic 
error term. 
The variables in the regression analysis are transformed into logarithmic 
forms as the parameters 1, 2 and 3 are estimates of elasticities. Hence, 
the estimated coefficients show the percentage change in the dependent var-
iable when the relevant explanatory variables change with one percentage, 
simplifying the interpretation of the econometric results (Stock & Watson, 
2015). 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽3𝐿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 [10] 
The market transactions that make up the dependent variable in the model 
show a large spread since both very high and low sale prices on agricultural 
land are included in it, as Figure 5 and Table 2 (page 24) show. 
Figure 5. Distribution of prices. Source: NAI Svefa, own processing. 
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Figure 6 and Table 2 indicate that the data are positively skewed, ranging 
between 2 and 7. This means that the data is right skewed distributed, mean-
ing that most of the prices are lower than the mean price, while extremely 
high price creates a right-wing tail (Desbois et al., 2013). 
In an OLS-regression may skewness, asymmetric and large spread lead to 
heteroscedasticity, which means that the variance of the conditional distribu-
tion of the error term is not equal over the independent regressor (Stock & 
Watson, 2015). Heteroscedasticity implies that the regression coefficients are 
systematically misjudged, and their corresponding p-values might lead to 
wrong statistical diagnosis, which may lead to the conclusion that a regres-
sions coefficient is statically significant even if not. 
 
Quantile regression 
A quantile regression can be more useful than an OLS-regression when 
the dependent variable suffers from skewness and the underlying regression 
model is characterized by heteroscedasticity of the error terms. Quantile re-
gression estimates on a specific quantile/percentile on the dependent varia-
bles distribution while keeping all observations in the model, rather than the 
estimate on the conditional mean, as an OLS-regression does (Desbois et al., 
2013, Johansson & Nilsson, 2012). While OLS matches a line through the 
minimised squares of the residuals, the quantile regression finds a line 
through the minimised sum of the absolute residuals. Also, quantile regres-
sion weight outliers to have a smaller impact, which results in a more robust 
estimate (Koenker & Hallock, 2001). 
Also, since there is a large spread in the dependent variable, a quantile 
regression is positive to use since the effect of the regressors on the depend-
ent variable may be different for different quantiles, as Johansson & Nilsson 
(2012) found out. 
The quantile regression model has the following form (Young, et al., 
2008) 
𝑄𝑦𝑖{𝜏|𝑥} =  𝛽0 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽3𝐿𝑖 + 𝐹𝑢
−1(𝜏) [11] 
where Qyi is the conditional value of the dependent variable given τ in the 
ith trial. τ denotes the quantile/percentile, x is the value of the independent 
variable in the ith trial and Fu is the common distribution function of the error, 
given τ. 
Even if the OLS-regression have some drawbacks when the dependent 
variable is asymmetrically distributed, both OLS-regression and quantile re-
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gressions are used in this study. Using both techniques gives a better under-
standing of how direct payments are capitalised into agricultural land prices 
since it combines estimations on the average, median, quantiles and the 95th 
percentile and therefore provides a broader picture. 
 
Stepwise regression 
The quantile and OLS regressions are executed by using an automatic 
backward stepwise technique in Stata 13. The decoupled direct payments re-
gressor is locked in and cannot be removed since that explanatory variable is 
of most interest for this study. The usage of a backward stepwise technique 
provides the best model for each unique regression and it simplifies the in-
terpretation of the results since there may be fewer regressors to examine. 
Since this thesis considers 35 regressions (one panel data regressions, six 
OLS regressions and 28 quantile regressions), an easy interpretation is 
needed. 
But, the backward stepwise regression has some drawbacks. It may not 
always result in the best model since the regressor removed or added in each 
step is conditioned on the previously included regressors, which make the 
order of adding or removing important. A regressor that is insignificant may 
be significant if another regressor(s) is removed from the model (Lewis, 
2007). Also, the automatic removal and adding do not understand the data or 
the implication of it. Therefore, a better understanding of the data and a better 
model may reduce the need for stepwise regression (Judd et al., 2015). 
However, the extensive literature review has provided a good understand-
ing of the model and the data. Furthermore, the risk that some regression may 
not be regressed in the best way can also be true for the model when all re-
gressors are included. Therefore, despite its shortcomings, is the backward 
stepwise technique used in the thesis. 
 
Panel data 
Panel data consists of observations on the same entity, i, (in this case 239 
municipalities) over two or more time periods, t (in this case the years 2005, 
2007, 2009, 2011 & 2013). A fixed effect regression is, which gives an op-
portunity to control for omitted variables that vary between municipalities 
but not over time (local culture, for example). The dataset used in the thesis 
is balanced, meaning that it has observations on all variables for all years 
(Stock & Watson, 2015). 
A fixed effects regression model uses OLS-technique to execute the re-
gression. The equation looks like: 
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𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑙𝑔𝛽1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽3𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝑦 +  𝛽4𝑍𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖     [12] 
where Zi is an unobserved variable that varies over entities but not over 
time (local culture, for example). The variables of interest are β1, 2, 3, hence 
the slopes of the different independent variables. y is a dummy variable for 
the years, which aim to grasp the effect of each year on the dependent varia-
ble. Since Zi vary over municipalities but is constant over time, the regression 
model can be interpreted as having n intercepts, one for each municipality. 
Then β0 +β4 = αi, and equation 12 can be simplified to the fixed effects re-
gression model (ibid): 
𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽1𝐸𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽2𝑆𝑖 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝛽3𝐿𝑖 + 𝑦 + 𝛼𝑖  + 𝜀𝑖. [13] 
αi is the entity fixed effect, which differs for all municipalities, while the 
slope of β1, 2, 3 is the same for all municipalities. Hence, αi can be viewed as 
the effect of being in municipality i, each municipality’s unique intercept. By 
using this technique, the effect of the agricultural support over time can be 
estimated, taking variables that vary between municipalities into account 
(ibid). 
 
Measures of goodness of fit 
The coefficient of determination, R2, which is the fraction of the sample 
variance of the dependent variable, explained by the explanatory variables, 
is used for determining how well the model fits the data. A high value indi-
cates a correlation between the regressors and the dependent variable. 
However, a value R2 close to one does not mean that the chosen regressors 
are the best to explain variance in the dependent variable since that also de-
pend on the data material, data-quality and the economic theory used (Stock 
& Watson, 2015). 
To determine if the estimated regressors have a statistically significant 
impact on the dependent variable or not, the p-value is used. The p-value 
indicates whether the null hypothesis can be rejected or not. In this study is 
the significance level 1 %, 5 % and 10 %, indicated by asterisks. If the sig-
nificance level is over 10 %, the regressor is not significant, and its impact 
on the dependent variable is questionable (ibid). 
3.4 Data 
All data in this study is aggregated to municipality level. There are 290 
municipalities in Sweden, but it has not been possible to find correct data on 
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all years for all municipalities. The number of municipalities for each regres-
sion is showed in the results table. The source and explanation for each re-
gressor are found in chapter 3.3 Regression coefficients. 
The dataset does not include any time dimension variable. Because of this, 
the regression for each investigated year does not say anything about how 
regional variations in agricultural land price change over time, only how the 
price fluctuates due to variations at a given point in the time. Due to this, 
there is no need for macroeconomic variables since all buyers and sellers 
meet the same level on interest rates, prices, inflation and so on at a given 
point in time (Johansson & Nilsson, 2012). However, since regressions are 
executed for several years may indications on how policy changes affected 
the capitalising degree be view in the results. 
3.5 Agricultural land value data 
The land value data comes from a database for market transactions that 
evaluation institute NAI Svefa has provided. It consists of price on agricul-
tural property transfers, which mean that the calculated average SEK/hectare 
prices for agricultural land may be lower than it really is, since no property 
regulations is included in the data. 
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As previously written, Figure 1 
showed a price gap between arable land 
and pasture land. It would have been fa-
vourably to be able to separate these 
two land types in the dataset, in order to 
see the capitalisation degree on arable 
land since that is where the largest price 
increase has occurred. It is, however, 
difficult to separate these two types of 
land given the information in the data-
base. The database, which consists of 
17 260 market transactions, provides 
information on the purchases sum, the 
municipality and the hectares of agri-
cultural land in each purchase. With this 
information is has been possible to cal-
culate the average price of agricultural 
land in the municipality. 
Figure 6 shows the average 
SEK/hectare for agricultural land be-
tween 2003-2016. The price is highest 
in the coastal areas, close to the greater 
cities and the larger, where the most fer-
tile soil is located. This follows the the-
oretical framework, that prices are 
higher close to cities and where the soil is more fertile. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 shows that the median- and mean 
price increase for all years, and that the gap between the mean and median 
increases from 15 00 SEK to 48 00 SEK between 2003 and 2016. The skew-
ness is, as mentioned earlier, positive, which indicate an asymmetric distri-
bution of prices. The municipalities with the high average prices in 2009 and 
2016 are Lysekil and Lund. 
Agricultural land prices 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 45 911 55 182 83 182 91 855 97 966 114 025 153 821
Median 30 663 38 771 59 958 65 005 72 256 89 091 105 584
Standard Deviation 60 695 54 743 80 083 112 362 81 920 84 814 158 187
Minimum 4 061 5 910 5 500 13 299 7 500 24 140 5 000
Maximum 513 550 518 740 547 929 1 295 625 499 333 487 000 1 402 339
Skewnes 5 5 3 7 3 2 4
Figure 6. Average purchase sum 2003-
2016. Source: NAI Svefa, own processing. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for agricultural land prices. Source: NAI Svefa, own processing. 
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3.6 Regression coefficients 
The regression coefficients are chosen since they capture the effect of the 
profitability and structure of the agricultural sector, agricultural policies, ur-
banisation and demand for agricultural land for other reasons than farming. 
These factors were in the literature review pointed out as important variables 
when it comes to determining the price and value of agricultural land. To 
increase the clarity in this chapter, the coefficients are divided into three dif-
ferent subgroups; Agricultural economic variables, Agricultural support var-
iables and Location/urbanisation variables. 
 
Agricultural economic variables 
Average yield in the municipality is a variable that relates to the fertility of 
the soil, which is a major driver of the price on agricultural land (Johansson 
& Nilsson, 2012, Kilian et al., 2012). The data used 
are from the Swedish Board of Agricultural and are 
the average yield of spring barley between 1985 to 
1989. The age of the data is not a problem; it is ra-
ther an advantage. At that time were cultivation 
techniques not as developed as today and the 
organic production, in which the yields are lower, 
were not as common as today. Therefore, this older 
value should lead to a more true value of the soil quality, less depending on 
farmer's knowledge, other inputs and the production technique. The maxi-
mum yield of 5 760 kg arrives from Trelleborg, the south of Sweden. Better 
soil quality should correspond to a higher price per hectare. 
Table 4 displays the descriptive statistics for the other of the agricultural 
economic variables. The average farm size relates to the structure and prof-
itability of the agricultural, and a higher average farm size indicates a higher 
degree of rationalisation and economy of scale. Areas with more rationalisa-
tion should show higher prices on agricultural land since the value of an extra 
hectare is higher than for small-scale farmers. The average farm size differs 
widely across the municipalities, but the median and mean are rather close to 
each other. 
The last three regressors, share of pasture of agricultural land, share of 
fallow of agricultural land and share of agricultural land of total municipal-
ity area, display the structure of the agricultural and land usage in the munic-
ipalities. A larger share of pasture in a municipality should have a negative 
effect on the price on agricultural land, since the price for pasture land is 
much lower than the price for areal land, as Figure 1 showed. 
Mean 3 291
Median 3 256
Standard Deviation 823
Minimum 1 300
Maximum 5 760
Average yield, kg/ha
Table 3. Descriptive statis-
tics of the average yield. 
Source: SBA, own processing. 
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Brady et al., (2017) show that passive farming is something that mainly 
occurs in regions with lower profitability and on marginal land. Therefore, 
in municipalities with a high share of fallow, the price on agricultural land 
should be lower. 
The share of agricultural land of the total area in the municipality could 
have both a negative and positive impact on the price. The more land there is 
to buy, for any reason, leads to, according to ordinary supply-demand rules, 
to a lower price. On the other side, in municipalities with a high share of 
agricultural land are farming probably a more important sector, leading to 
more farmers that can bid on the land. 
 
Location/urbanisation variables 
To investigate how demand for agricultural land for other purposes than 
agricultural and how urbanisation influences the price on agricultural land, 
the following regressors are considered:  population density (population/km2) 
in the municipality, the number of apartments started in the municipality 
each year and the average price of agricultural land on the county included 
in the model. The urbanisation and usage of land for other things than agri-
cultural are an important determinant of the price, as described in the litera-
ture review. See for example Smith (1776), Von Thünen (1826) and Dobb 
(2005). 
Average farm size 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 46 41 40 40 41 52 48
Median 39 35 34 34 35 48 42
Standard Deviation 22 20 20 18 20 23 24
Minimum 15 11 11 11 11 19 11
Maximum 149 154 162 119 150 156 167
Share pasture 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 0,16 0,17 0,16 0,15 0,16 0,13 0,16
Median 0,12 0,12 0,12 0,1 0,13 0,1 0,12
Standard Deviation 0,11 0,12 0,12 0,11 0,12 0,11 0,12
Minimum 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01
Maximum 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,6 0,6 0,6
Share fallow 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 0,09 0,1 0,09 0,06 0,06 0,05 0,06
Median 0,09 0,09 0,08 0,04 0,04 0,04 0,05
Standard Deviation 0,05 0,05 0,06 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05
Minimum 0,01 0,01 0,01 0 0 0,01 0,01
Maximum 0,26 0,27 0,39 0,24 0,29 0,21 0,24
Share agricultural 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 0,19 0,19 0,18 0,18 0,2 0,28 0,21
Median 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,01 0,02 0,01
Standard Deviation 0,16 0,16 0,15 0,15 0,17 0,19 0,18
Minimum 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,02 0,03 0,02
Maximum 0,79 0,79 0,83 0,79 0,79 0,79 0,83
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of agricultural economic variables. Source: SBA, own processing. 
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Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the population density, number 
of apartments started each year and the average county price. The population 
density minimum and maximum values differ a lot, from 1 inhabitant per km2 
to 2 098. The values for the median and mean do also indicate that the 
population's density varies across municipalities. The same accounts for the 
variable number of apartments started in the municipality each year. The 
smallest value is 1, while the maximum is 2 040 apartments started for one 
single year. 
Higher population density should correspond with a higher price on agri-
cultural land since it indicates that the degree of urbanisation is higher. 
The apartments started each year indicate the rate on conversion. When 
building houses, land sometimes is converted from agricultural land to hous-
ing land, which increases the competition on the remaining agricultural land, 
leading to higher prices. 
The price on land in one municipality depends not only on factors inside 
the municipality but also on factors outside. Therefore, the average price of 
agricultural land in the county us used as a variable, to be able to determine 
the connection between nearby areas and the investigated municipality. The 
average county price increase for all years, as Table 6 shows. The effect of 
the price in nearby municipalities should correspond with higher price of 
agricultural land in the investigated municipality. 
Agricultural support variables 
There is a broad range of support in the CAP, but for simplicity, supports 
with the same aim are merged into four different categories in this thesis. All 
support is expressed in SEK/hectare and calculated by dividing the sum of 
Population density 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 53 50 49 50 62 48 70
Median 30 27 26 26 30 33 33
Standard Deviation 97 91 92 94 166 52 179
Minimum 2 1 1 2 2 5 2
Maximum 1 061 1 076 1 095 1 126 1 931 387 2 098
New apartments 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 82 105 85 58 89 104 211
Median 19 28 25 20 21 28 45
Standard Deviation 2 039 1 849 1 797 1 007 2 010 1 330 3 160
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Maximum 2 040 1 850 1 798 1 008 2 011 1 331 3 161
Average county price 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 49 051 56 288 90 044 90 749 104 084 128 818 148 512
Median 36 236 48 322 72 732 101 139 86 502 102 523 124 358
Standard Deviation 45 672 34 309 57 154 41 681 61 912 92 036 93 622
Minimum 7 184 10 657 19 656 19 886 21 474 21 010 29 943
Maximum 221 584 187 303 371 200 188 891 260 079 651 496 338 323
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of location variables. Source: SBA, own processing. 
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each support in the municipality by the hectare agricultural land in the mu-
nicipality. This procedure results in some very low SEK/ha values since not 
all farmers in a municipality receive all kind of support, but the support is 
divided among all farmers land. 
Single Farm Payments (SFP) are the decoupled direct payments that 
started to replace the coupled direct payments in 2005. SFP should increase 
the capitalisation degree of agricultural support, as the literature review 
showed (Latruffe & Le Mouël, 2009; Johansson & Nilsson; 2012, Kilian et 
al.,2012; Swinnen et al., 2013 and Ciaian et al., 2014).  
Coupled refers to coupled direct payments in 2003, and after 2003 only to 
coupled support, often to agricultural branches with lower profitability. The 
effect of the coupled support on the capitalisation degree should be positive 
before 2005. 
LFA is a support to farmers in less favourable areas and aims to compen-
sate the farmer for the less fertile soil and lower profitability. Kilian et al 
(2012) estimated the effect of LFA-support and gained the result that the 
support had a positive effect on the price of agricultural land. 
ENVIECO is a group of supports to farmers that conducts environmental 
measurements, such as care of pasture land, perennial grass cultivation, 
maintenance of natural- and cultural elements, convert to organic farming or 
already are practising organic farming, etc. These supports are not as likely 
as the SFP to capitalise in higher land prices since the farmer needs to fulfil 
extra requirements to receive them (holding animals on grazing or establish 
a wetland). Johansson & Nilsson (2012) show that environmental-support 
correlates with lower hectare price on agricultural land, probably linked to 
the fact that support for environmental measurements is more used in areas 
with lower productivity and fragile environmental land. Also, organic 
farmers and farmers that applied for environmental support must obey stricter 
rules, which might correspond to a lower price on agricultural land. 
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SFP, SEK/ha 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 1 545 1 831 2 018 1 839 1 957 1 174
Median 1 508 1 800 1 981 1 811 1 933 1 214
Standard Deviation 273 252 283 299 310 317
Minimum 661 1 198 1 336 1 203 1 303 188
Maximum 2 235 2 535 2 955 2 895 3 332 2 296
Coupled, SEK/ha 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 1 053 167 83 89 96 41 268
Median 1 094 154 78 79 73 26 263
Standard Deviation 326 88 48 56 117 38 147
Minimum 188 10 0 3 1 1 11
Maximum 1 757 425 259 289 1 075 157 773
LFA, SEK/ha 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 471 381 472 458 450 323 407
Median 472 204 244 252 238 84 227
Standard Deviation 318 478 619 586 610 601 578
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 299 2 372 3 330 3 324 3 577 3 398 3 245
ENVIECO, SEK/ha 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016
Mean 416 782 767 768 890 923 392
Median 355 798 763 759 917 942 361
Standard Deviation 276 323 334 348 378 423 193
Minimum 9 121 63 142 89 68 41
Maximum 1 346 1 713 1 734 1 798 1 846 2 633 1 135
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of agricultural support. Source: SBA, own processing. 
 30 
The result chapter presents the findings of the study, with a focus on the 
SFP variable. The focus is on the decoupled direct payments variable since 
it is of most interest for the study and for being able to answer the research 
questions. The full results table, for all regressions on all quantiles, are found 
in the appendix. 
4.1 Median regression 
Agricultural economic variables 
None of the agricultural economic variables are significant in 2003, as 
Table 7 shows. The fertility of the soil (yield) has an estimated positive con-
nection with the price of agricultural land on 0.32 % in 2003 and 0.30 % in 
2013, but the effect is not statistically significant. Even if the yield variable 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the price of agricultural land, 
the positive direction of this explanatory variable is probably right, since pre-
vious studies have concluded that a higher fertility of the soil corresponds to 
higher prices on agricultural land (Lundell & Östlund (2010), Johansson & 
Nilsson (2012), Kilian et al (2012), Westman (2013). 
The average farm size has a statistically significant negative estimate in 
2005 but has a statistically significant positive connection in 2013 and 2016. 
If the share of pasture increases by 1 % in a municipality, it induces a 
statistically significant negative correlation with the price of agricultural 
land, by -0.08 % in 2013 and -0.1 % in 2016. As described in chapter 1 the 
price of pasture land is lower than the price of arable land, and since agricul-
tural land includes both pasture and arable land, it is expected to find a neg-
ative effect of this explanatory variable on the price of land. 
The result does not show any statistically significant estimation for the 
share of fallow, but it shows one negative estimation for 2013. However, 
even if that estimation not is statistically significant, the negativity is in line 
with Brady et al., (2017) finding, that most of the passive farming is 
conducted on margin land in low profitability areas, where the price on 
agricultural land is lower. 
The share of agricultural land in the municipality has one statistically sig-
nificant estimation, 0.14 % in 2009. The positive sign indicates that in mu-
nicipalities with a larger share of agricultural land than in the median munic-
ipality the price of agricultural land is higher. 
4 Results 
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Location-specific variables 
The average county price is statistically significant at a 1 % level for all 
estimated years. It has a positive effect on the price of agricultural land with 
estimates ranging from 0.29 to 0.51 %. This finding indicates that there is a 
connection between surrounding areas and the investigated municipality, but 
not the causality. The investigated municipality may have influenced the sur-
rounding areas or vice versa. 
The variable for apartments construction has a statistically significant pos-
itive effect on the price of agricultural in 2003, 2007, 2009 and 2016. The 
effects are however small, 0.07 % at most. This is consistent with the litera-
ture, that the demand for agricultural land for other usages than agricultural, 
mainly urban usage, is positively connected with the price of agricultural 
land. 
The population density has for all investigated years a positive and statis-
tically significant effects on the price of agricultural land. The effects range 
from 0.12 to 0.36, thus indicating that the price on agricultural land is higher 
in more urban municipalities with higher population density, a finding that is 
in line with the theory. 
 
Support variables 
The single farm payments variable indicates when regressed on the me-
dian, that the decoupled direct payments capitalise in higher land prices, with 
statistically significant results for 2009 and 2011. In municipalities with a 1 
% increase in decoupled direct payments the price of agricultural land is 0.54 
% higher in 2009 and 0.77 % higher in 2011. This finding is in line with 
previous research work in the field and with theoretical findings (see Latruffe 
& Le Mouël, 2009, Johansson & Nilsson, 2012, Killian et al., 2012, Swinnen 
et al, 2013, Ciaian et al., 2014). 
The other support variables, which all are continuous, indicate a statisti-
cally significant negative correlation with the price of agricultural land. Sup-
port to less-favoured areas has in 2009 an estimated negative relationship 
with the price of land at -0.04 %. This negative result is opposite to the one 
found in Kilian et al (2012), which received a positive result. 
The negative connection with the price of land of coupled support is esti-
mated to be -0.09 % in 2009 and -0.1 % in 2011. The coupled support in 2009 
and 2011 is coupled support to specific branches and not coupled to direct 
payments. 
The estimated effect of environmental-organic support is -0.23 % in 2003 
and -0.18 % in 2005. This means that in municipalities with a 1 % higher 
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environmental support the price on agricultural land is 0.2 % lower. The neg-
ative effect is in line with the findings of Johansson & Nilsson (2012) and 
Kilian et al., (2012). 
The R-squared for the regressions are lowest in 2003 when it is 34 % and 
it is as highest in 2013 when it is 45 %. Overall, the model does explain a 
greater variance in the dependent variable for the later years than for the first 
years. 
Table 7. Estimated effects on the price of agricultural land at the median. 
Median regressions        
Variables 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2016 
        
Yield 0.319     0.301  
 (0.271)     (0.264)  
Average farm size  -0.257***    0.232** 0.413*** 
  (0.0942)    (0.106) (0.0928) 
Share pasture      -0.0808* -0.0975** 
      (0.0467) (0.0424) 
Share fallow      -0.0696  
      (0.0472)  
Share agriland    0.136***    
    (0.0513)    
Population density 0.163*** 0.124** 0.361*** 0.146*** 0.163*** 0.266*** 0.138** 
 (0.0621) (0.0536) (0.0528) (0.0434) (0.0539) (0.0554) (0.0559) 
Newbuild 0.0704*** 0.0744***  0.0745*** 0.0369 0.0343 0.0428* 
 (0.0211) (0.0194)  (0.0215) (0.0245) (0.0214) (0.0234) 
Avg. county price 0.292*** 0.510*** 0.405*** 0.341*** 0.372*** 0.355*** 0.425*** 
 (0.0829) (0.0721) (0.0851) (0.0703) (0.0856) (0.0706) (0.0755) 
SFP  0.509 0.0567 0.536* 0.771*** 0.106 0.153 
  (0.311) (0.327) (0.278) (0.259) (0.306) (0.119) 
Coupled -0.0694   -0.0917*** -0.0995*** -0.0255*  
 (0.0890)   (0.0277) (0.0364) (0.0146)  
LFA     -0.0359*  -0.0368 
     (0.0209)  (0.0228) 
ENVIECO -0.232*** -0.180*      
 (0.0652) (0.108)      
Constant 2.508*** 1.241 2.116** 1.366 0.521 0.783 1.428*** 
 (0.806) (1.021) (1.036) (1.036) (0.898) (0.979) (0.533) 
Observations 212 211 205 209 214 221 223 
R2 34% 38% 34% 34% 41% 45% 44% 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
4.2 Quantile & OLS regression 
Figure 8 displays all statistically significant SFP estimations for all quan-
tiles and the OLS-regression. It does not present any other variables than the 
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decoupled direct payment due to the reason previously stated; it is the decou-
pled direct payments that are of most interest to the study. The full results, 
together with the standard errors, are displayed in Appendix 1. 
In 2005 and 2016 the 25th percentile and the OLS regression is significant, 
in 2009 the median and 75th percentile is significant, in 2011 the 25th percen-
tile, the median and the OLS regression is significant. From 2005 to 2011 the 
estimated elasticity does vary between 0.5 to 0.8 %, while the capitalising 
degree for 2016 is around 0.2 %. There is no statistically significant regres-
sion on the 95th percentile, or for 2007 and 2013. Also, it is important to 
notice that 2016 shows a much lower capitalising degree then the previous 
year. 
The result of the quantile regressions shows that the capitalising degree of 
the decoupled direct payments is different for different quantiles, due to the 
skewness and asymmetric dependent variable. It can be noted that for those 
years that have at least two statistically significant results (OLS not in-
cluded), 2009 and 2011, the trend is that higher quantiles exhibit a higher 
capitalising degree. This indicates the same thing as the study of Johansson 
& Nilsson (2012) does, that the capitalising degree is higher in municipalities 
with higher prices on agricultural land. 
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Figure 7. The estimated capitalising degree of the decoupled direct payments. All piles shown in 
the figure are statistically significant on at least 10 % level. 
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4.3 Panel data regression 
Table 8. Panel data regression results. 
The result pertaining to the panel data 
regression is displayed in Table 8. The 
estimated effect of the decoupled direct 
payments is positive, 0.05 %, but it is 
not statistically significant. The LFA-
support, as well as the coupled support 
and the environmental-organic support 
are not statistically significant. 
The average county price is statisti-
cally significant correlated with the de-
pendent variable, estimated at 0.56 % 
The share of pasture has a statisti-
cally negative correlation on -0.25 % 
with the price of agricultural land. The 
average county price is positively cor-
related with the dependent variable, 
0.56 %. 
All time dummy variables are statis-
tically significant and have a positive 
correlation with the price of agricul-
tural land. 
The R2 is 36 %, which is in line with 
the R2-values in from the median quan-
tile regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Panel data  
Variables 2005-2013 
  
Farmsize 0.00176 
 (0.269) 
Share pasture -0.201 
 (0.144) 
Share fallow -0.00713 
 (0.0486) 
Share agriland 0.326 
 (0.313) 
Population density 0.429 
 (0.721) 
Newbuild 0.0211 
 (0.0151) 
Avg. county price 0.558*** 
 (0.0691) 
SFP 0.0482 
 (0.274) 
LFA -0.0140 
 (0.0437) 
Coupled -0.0112 
 (0.0107) 
ENVIECO -0.103 
 (0.111) 
2007 0.0958*** 
 (0.0304) 
2009 0.0801** 
 (0.0403) 
2011 0.134*** 
 (0.0344) 
2013 0.117*** 
 (0.0418) 
Constant 1.611 
 (1.684) 
Observations 1,060 
Number of id 235 
R2 0.360 
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The result of the study, the model and limitations of the study is discussed 
in this chapter. 
 
The result of this study supports the idea and theory that agricultural sup-
port may influence and capitalise in agricultural land value. It indicates that 
the decoupled direct payments are capitalised in agricultural land prices, with 
an estimated elasticity on the median that range between 0.54 % (2009) and 
0.77 % (2011). Hence, the results indicate that in municipalities with 1 % 
higher decoupled direct payments compared to the median municipality, the 
price of agricultural land is correlated to be 0.54 - 0.77 % higher. This finding 
is in line with the theoretical framework and previous research, especially 
with the two most comparable studies, by Johansson & Nilsson (2012) and 
Kilian et al., (2012). Johansson & Nilsson estimate an elasticity of 0.6 % on 
the median municipality, while Kilian et al., estimate the elasticity on the 
mean to be between 0.28 – 0.78, depending on the type of land and entitle-
ments model. The result is also in line with Latruffe & Le Mouël (2009) and 
Swinnen et al., (2013). They conclude in their meta-studies that the estimated 
elasticity between agricultural income payments and the price of agricultural 
land always are between zero and one. 
The estimations on decoupled direct payments on the median are however 
only significant for two years, 2009 and 2011. It is hard to say why significant 
results only occurs for two years, but it makes it clear that it is important to 
interpret the results with caution and not take it for the only truth. When 
looking at the mean, median, quantiles and OLS regression there are, how-
ever, significant and positively correlated results for five of the seven years, 
which underpin the idea that the decoupled direct payments capitalise in 
higher land prices. 
Furthermore, the results of the quantile regressions and mean regression 
indicate that the capitalisation degree for decoupled direct payments is higher 
in municipalities with higher prices on agricultural land, a finding that also 
is consistent with Johansson & Nilsson (2012). The higher capitalising de-
gree in more expensive areas such (Skåne & Östergötland, for example) may 
depend on the fact that the direct payments have been higher in these areas, 
since the profitability have been higher in these areas. The high direct pay-
ment per hectare may have worked as a driver for farmers to buy more land, 
5 Discussion 
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since the value of the entitlement that is linked to the land is higher. An im-
plication of the larger capitalising is that it becomes harder for young people 
to buy land in these areas and start their career as farmers. This can in a longer 
timeframe have a negative impact on the area since the age structure of the 
farmers may be difficult to change. The result and explanation could however 
be more carefully examined and discussed in further studies where the result 
shows a more significance. 
The LFA-support and ENVIECO-support are on the other hand, contrary 
to the results for direct payments, negatively connected with the price of ag-
ricultural land. In those municipalities that receive more LFA support and/or 
environmental-organic support the price of agricultural land is lower, com-
pared with the median municipality. Johansson & Nilsson (2012) and Kilian 
et al., (2012) do also find a negative correlation between environmental sup-
port and land value, but the later article finds a positive correlation between 
LFA areas and land value. 
The negative capitalising degree that ENVIECO-support exhibits can be 
due to under-compensation to farmers. The restrictions that farmers must 
obey to get the ENVIECO-support may create a larger loss in earnings than 
what the support cover for. The same reasoning can be valid for those cases 
where the LFA-support exhibits that the profitability of the land is lower than 
what the support compensate for. In LFA-areas in Bavaria farmers may on 
the other hand be overcompensated. 
However, the findings in the thesis need to be interpreted with caution. 
Correlations between different forms of agricultural support and the price of 
agricultural land has been found, but the causality of the correlation has not 
been investigated. The price of agricultural land is, as Figure 7 shows, higher 
in the south of Sweden and at the larger cereal plains. The agriculture sector 
in these areas are more rationalised than average, the soil is more fertile, the 
production is higher, and the agricultural land is more expensive, as Figure 3 
indicates. Due to the higher production and the hybrid implementation 
model, these areas have received higher decoupled direct payments per 
hectare. Therefore, this study cannot conclude whether the direct payments 
drive up the price on agricultural land, only that it exists a connection be-
tween the price of land and the decoupled direct payments. 
A clear change in the capitalising degree of the decoupled direct payments 
can be seen when comparing the results from the quantile and OLS regres-
sion from 2016 with the other investigated years. It is much lower in 2016 
then before, down from a span of 0.8 – 0.5 to 0.2. The lower values for 2016 
may be due to the reformed CAP, which was rolled out in 2014. 
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The harmonisation of decoupled direct payments in the 2013 CAP reform 
are thought to have a positive effect on the capitalising degree, while the 
differentiation of support to farmers and greening support are supposed to 
have a negative effect. Since the harmonisation starts in 2015 and ends in 
2020 in Sweden, the effect of it in 2016 may be small. On the other hand, 
since the greening and differentiation of support to farmers were imple-
mented from 2015 and onwards, they could have had a negative effect on the 
capitalising degree in 2016. 
The agriculturally related variables in the study (yield, average farmsize, 
share pasture, share fallow and share agriland) do not always indicate sta-
tistically significant correlations with the price of agricultural land, as the full 
result table in appendix 1 shows. This is in contrast with the literature review, 
in which these factors were found to influence the price, especially the fertil-
ity of the soil. Why these variables not always indicate statically significant 
correlations can have a natural explanation – they do not influence the price 
of agricultural land. 
However, that explanation is not very likely since it stands against previ-
ous studies and literature. It is more likely that it depends on the data. For 
example, the dependent variable price per hectare is for some year and mu-
nicipalities constituted of just three-four market transactions, which can give 
a misleading average price of agricultural land for that municipality and year. 
A way for solving this problem could have been to aggregate to county level 
instead of municipality level. But, in that case, the number of observations 
would decrease from around 210 to just 21. Also, using support level per 
country instead of per municipality would not have worked well together 
with the fact that the support per hectare differs in counties. 
Why the, according to previous studies and literature, important factor soil 
fertility does not show statically significant correlation with the price of ag-
ricultural land is difficult to explain. One explanation may be that the data on 
soil fertility is older than the market transactions, but as discussed in the data 
chapter the effect of using old data can even be positive, since it can show a 
more true value of the soil fertility. 
An important point to make is that the variable average county price is 
made up of the same market transactions that lie behind the dependent vari-
able. This creates a risk of endogeneity in the regression. However, even if 
the average county price is based on the same data as the dependent variable, 
is it not influenced by the dependent variable. 
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Here the conclusions of the study are drawn and proposal for further 
research and policy recommendations are made. 
 
The aim of this study, to answer the research questions “To which extent 
is EU’ s agricultural support within the CAP, especially looking at the de-
coupled direct payments, capitalised in agricultural land prices in Sweden 
during 2003 – 2016 and how does the capitalising degree change over the 
same time, particularly after the 2013 CAP reform?” has been fulfilled by 
using a combination of the traditional capitalisation model and hedonic pric-
ing model. Conventional (mean) and quantile regressions have been used to 
a cross-sectional dataset for the years 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 
and 2016 to determine how agricultural supports affects the price of agricul-
tural land. Also, a panel data regression for the years 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 
and 2013 was performed to investigate the overall effect the agricultural sup-
port had on the price of agricultural land under the first CAP-period with 
decoupled direct payments. For all regressions, the price of agricultural land, 
aggregated to municipality level and based on 17 000 market transactions, 
has been the dependent variable. 
The literature review focused on how agricultural support capitalises in 
land prices and which factors influence the price of agricultural land. It was 
found that factors like the fertility of the soil, agricultural structure, profita-
bility, share of pasture and fallow land in the municipality, localisation, ag-
ricultural policies and usage of agricultural land to other purposes have an 
impact on the price of agricultural land. These factors have been used, to-
gether with a variable for decoupled direct payments, coupled payments, 
LFA-support and environmental-organic support, as regressors in the regres-
sions. In the panel data regression a time dummy variable is also included. 
The answer to the first research question, to which extent the agricultural 
support, especially the decoupled direct payments, has capitalised in higher 
agricultural land prices in Sweden between 2003 and 2016, is an estimated 
elasticity between 0.19 – 0.84 %. If the result for 2016 are excluded, the es-
timated span is between 0.48 – 0.84 %, well in line with the literature, mainly 
Latruffe & Le Mouël (2009), Johansson & Nilsson (2012), Kilian et al., 
(2012).  
It is important to note that the result of the thesis indicates a correlation, 
but not the causal relationship between the decoupled direct payments and 
6 Conclusions 
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price of agricultural land. This thesis cannot conclude that decoupled direct 
payments drive up the price, only that the decoupled direct payments is cap-
italised in agricultural land prices. 
The LFA-support, ENVIECO-support and coupled support show all a 
negative correlation with the price of agricultural land, in contrast to the de-
coupled direct payments. 
The results of this thesis indicate that the answer to the second research 
question, if the capitalising degree changes over time, particularly after the 
2013 CAP reform, is yes. Figure 8 shows that the capitalising degree is much 
lower after 2013 then what it is previous in the 2013 CAP reform, which may 
depend on the policy changes in the reform. 
To better examine the second research questions could further research be 
conducted. This thesis does only examine data for one year after the 2013 
CAP-reform. For a deeper understanding on how the 2013 reform affect the 
capitalising degree, data for more years after 2013 could be used. Such fur-
ther research would probably also better capture the effect of the shift from 
a hybrid to a regional implementation model. 
Another interesting research area, which has not been widely discussed in 
the thesis, is the effect on the ownership structure of agricultural land that the 
decoupled direct payments have. Sweden, among others, argues that one ef-
fect of the decoupled direct payments is that it becomes more expensive for 
young farmers to get into the business. Also, since the decoupled direct pay-
ments are capitalised in higher land values those farmers that own land is 
more benefitted than those farmers that rent land. Therefore, it would be in-
teresting to investigate deeper what effect the decoupled direct payments 
have on the ownership structure and how this affects the profitability and the 
generation renewal in the sector. 
This study has shown that the agricultural support within the CAP influ-
ences land value. The decoupled direct payments, which stands for more than 
half of the CAP budget as Figure 3 shows, have the largest effect on the price, 
as this study has shown. Therefore, the policy recommendations given will 
concentrate on the decoupled direct payments. However, to give policy rec-
ommendations the goal of the policy must be known. Since the introduction 
of this study highlighted the negative effects of the price increase of agricul-
tural land, the goal of the given policy recommendations is to slow down the 
price increase. Given the correlation between the decoupled direct payments 
and the price of agricultural land, one way to reduce or slow down the in-
crease in price, could be to reduce the amount of decoupled direct payments, 
which is the policy that Sweden argues for in the EU. It is also possible to 
increase the support to young farmers while decreasing the overall payment. 
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A switch like that would create a variance in the direct payments and lead to 
a decrease in the capitalising degree. 
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Appendix 1, econometrics result 
 
Appendix 
Year
Regressor/model 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS
Yield 0.578** 0.319 -0.761
(0.288) (0.271) (0.465)
Average farmsize 0.373 -0.254* -0.257*** 0.604*** -0.183*
(0.229) (0.133) (0.0942) (0.180) (0.103)
Share pasture -0.0931 -0.133
(0.0825) (0.123)
Share fallow -0.178 -0.148
(0.156) (0.0980)
Share agriland -0.378*** 0.156* -0.105 -0.451***
(0.128) (0.0822) (0.0832) (0.120)
Population density 0.143** 0.163*** 0.217** 0.151 0.168*** 0.0888 0.124** 0.204*** 0.478*** 0.148***
(0.0659) (0.0621) (0.0944) (0.110) (0.0576) (0.0656) (0.0536) (0.0694) (0.0918) (0.0537)
Newbuild 0.0766*** 0.0704*** 0.0434 0.0933** 0.0616*** 0.0845*** 0.0744*** 0.0621** 0.0464 0.0660***
(0.0224) (0.0211) (0.0330) (0.0370) (0.0203) (0.0234) (0.0194) (0.0256) (0.0310) (0.0193)
Avg. countyprice 0.254*** 0.292*** 0.572*** 0.923*** 0.489*** 0.387*** 0.510*** 0.586*** 0.811*** 0.458***
(0.0880) (0.0829) (0.111) (0.142) (0.0645) (0.0904) (0.0721) (0.0984) (0.134) (0.0733)
SFP 0.839** 0.509 0.208 0.438 0.673**
(0.417) (0.311) (0.454) (0.562) (0.318)
Coupled -0.0155 -0.0694 -0.128 0.184 0.00611 0.138** 0.0422
(0.0944) (0.0890) (0.134) (0.169) (0.0813) (0.0591) (0.0345)
LFA 0.0365 -0.0389 -0.132*** -0.0328
(0.0276) (0.0256) (0.0384) (0.0222)
Envieco -0.127* -0.232*** -0.140 -0.158 -0.171*** -0.240* -0.180* 0.355*
(0.0691) (0.0652) (0.0978) (0.116) (0.0594) (0.141) (0.108) (0.202)
Constant 1.262 2.508*** 2.304*** -1.047 2.368*** 0.909 1.241 0.911 -0.850 0.286
(0.856) (0.806) (0.740) (1.195) (0.436) (1.438) (1.021) (1.496) (2.171) (0.927)
Observations 212 212 212 212 212 211 211 211 211 211
R
2 33% 34% 33% 50% 54% 37% 38% 37% 41% 58%
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2003 2005
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Year
Regressor/model 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS
Yield 0.239 -0.361
(0.218) (0.278)
Average farmsize 0.209 0.433**
(0.127) (0.215)
Share pasture -0.0624
(0.0406)
Share fallow
Share agriland 0.107 0.204*** 0.136*** -0.163 0.0986
(0.0729) (0.0727) (0.0513) (0.141) (0.0619)
Population density 0.210*** 0.361*** 0.316*** 0.307* 0.243*** 0.0839 0.146*** 0.188*** 0.109**
(0.0583) (0.0528) (0.0794) (0.164) (0.0532) (0.0545) (0.0434) (0.0579) (0.0476)
Newbuild 0.0457* 0.0357 0.0461** 0.0705*** 0.0745*** 0.0405 0.169*** 0.0781***
(0.0241) (0.0340) (0.0216) (0.0262) (0.0215) (0.0296) (0.0436) (0.0231)
Avg. countyprice 0.415*** 0.405*** 0.435*** 0.643** 0.439*** 0.338*** 0.341*** 0.516*** 0.639*** 0.400***
(0.0825) (0.0851) (0.114) (0.264) (0.0787) (0.0976) (0.0703) (0.0904) (0.165) (0.0758)
SFP -0.171 0.0567 0.182 0.765 0.204 0.377 0.536* 0.805*** -0.346 0.375
(0.360) (0.327) (0.425) (1.014) (0.290) (0.347) (0.278) (0.301) (0.691) (0.301)
Coupled -0.111** -0.0917*** -0.131*** -0.0770**
(0.0539) (0.0277) (0.0380) (0.0319)
LFA 0.0408* -0.0320
(0.0229) (0.0269)
Envieco -0.262** -0.310 -0.106
(0.103) (0.194) (0.0925)
Constant 2.746** 2.116** 1.784 -0.960 0.706 3.794*** 1.366 -0.342 3.047 1.907*
(1.243) (1.036) (1.474) (3.211) (0.816) (1.421) (1.036) (0.971) (2.506) (1.123)
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 209 209 209 209 209
R
2 33% 34% 40% 42% 56% 33% 34% 37% 37% 55%
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20092007
Year
Regressor/model 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS
Yield 0.476* 1.573*** 0.419** 0.766*** 0.301 0.312 -0.661 0.370
(0.254) (0.598) (0.197) (0.291) (0.264) (0.276) (0.492) (0.225)
Average farmsize -0.341 0.147 0.232** 0.194*
(0.263) (0.120) (0.106) (0.114)
Share pasture -0.123** -0.0940** -0.136 -0.0445 -0.129** -0.0808* -0.136*** -0.197** -0.119***
(0.0587) (0.0462) (0.109) (0.0404) (0.0517) (0.0467) (0.0446) (0.0757) (0.0418)
Share fallow -0.138*** -0.0970** -0.0644* -0.125** -0.0696 -0.0729*
(0.0446) (0.0419) (0.0369) (0.0533) (0.0472) (0.0421)
Share agriland 0.170
(0.130)
Population density 0.0770 0.163*** 0.147*** 0.141*** 0.188*** 0.266*** 0.240*** 0.239*** 0.207***
(0.0538) (0.0539) (0.0489) (0.0440) (0.0603) (0.0554) (0.0589) (0.0839) (0.0485)
Newbuild 0.0509** 0.0369 0.0350 0.0276 0.0349 0.0343 0.0370 0.0462**
(0.0234) (0.0245) (0.0223) (0.0193) (0.0235) (0.0214) (0.0229) (0.0190)
Avg. countyprice 0.358*** 0.372*** 0.469*** 0.390* 0.350*** 0.253*** 0.355*** 0.464*** 0.783*** 0.403***
(0.0934) (0.0856) (0.0812) (0.225) (0.0743) (0.0784) (0.0706) (0.0766) (0.134) (0.0635)
SFP 0.684** 0.771*** -0.0457 -0.287 0.479* -0.391 0.106 -0.334 -0.0255 -0.140
(0.296) (0.259) (0.274) (0.657) (0.245) (0.336) (0.306) (0.266) (0.471) (0.275)
Coupled -0.117*** -0.0995*** -0.0773** -0.148* -0.112*** -0.0255* -0.0178 -0.0699** -0.0175
(0.0339) (0.0364) (0.0343) (0.0858) (0.0280) (0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0287) (0.0130)
LFA -0.0359* -0.0561*** -0.0328*
(0.0209) (0.0197) (0.0184)
Envieco 0.155
(0.123)
Constant -1.615 0.521 2.591*** -0.612 -0.0307 1.292 0.783 1.898* 3.363 1.572
(1.052) (0.898) (0.890) (1.891) (0.594) (1.021) (0.979) (1.014) (2.140) (1.009)
Observations 214 214 214 214 214 221 221 221 221 221
R
2 37% 41% 49% 48% 63% 39% 45% 50% 49% 67%
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
20132011
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Year
Regressor/model 25th 50th 75th 95th OLS
Yield
Average farmsize 0.325*** 0.413*** 0.199***
(0.0631) (0.0928) (0.0763)
Share pasture -0.125*** -0.0975** -0.117* -0.146* -0.104**
(0.0360) (0.0424) (0.0705) (0.0857) (0.0459)
Share fallow -0.0901** -0.0964 -0.0699
(0.0354) (0.0817) (0.0435)
Share agriland
Population density 0.136*** 0.138** 0.192*** 0.263*** 0.148***
(0.0401) (0.0559) (0.0670) (0.0944) (0.0472)
Newbuild 0.0440*** 0.0428* 0.0530 0.0569***
(0.0163) (0.0234) (0.0385) (0.0192)
Avg. countyprice 0.403*** 0.425*** 0.458*** 0.593*** 0.512***
(0.0496) (0.0755) (0.109) (0.111) (0.0591)
SFP 0.191* 0.153 0.231 0.338 0.206*
(0.0989) (0.119) (0.204) (0.235) (0.118)
Coupled -0.126** -0.195 -0.291** -0.177**
(0.0530) (0.120) (0.139) (0.0715)
LFA -0.0368 -0.0721**
(0.0228) (0.0326)
Envieco 0.283** 0.217 0.0887
(0.125) (0.142) (0.0730)
Constant 1.537*** 1.428*** 1.613** 0.684 1.169***
(0.335) (0.533) (0.814) (0.891) (0.447)
Observations 223 223 223 223 223
R
2 42% 44% 46% 52% 68%
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2016
